abstract: Much energy in economic sociology is expended on showing that core assumptions of microeconomics are too short sighted. It is assumed that sociology provides a better background for analysing and understanding economic institutions than economics itself. This is certainly true, but has led economic sociologists to treat economic theory as the 'other' of economic sociology. Thereby, the disciplinary boundary between economics and sociology is reproduced where economic sociology is understood the application of the 'sociology tradition' to economic phenomena. This article suggests a change of perspective: economic sociologists should treat economics as an endogenous part of its enquiries, but not to examine what economic theory is, but what it does, i.e. how economic theory shapes the economy. This requires introducing the study of language, concepts and semantic distinctions as an inherent part of economic sociology and its focus on the 'social' construction of economic institutions. Ultimately, this suggestion reorients our focus away from 'authors' to 'concepts'. In other words, if economic sociology wants to take the 'sociological' and linguistic turn in social theory with its focus on language seriously, it needs to redefine its boundaries.
Introduction
Since its re-emergence in the mid-1980s, economic sociology developed from a science of 'leftovers' (Granovetter, 1992: 89) into a vibrant research area (Guillén et al., 2002; Swedberg, 1997) . Meanwhile, a reader in economic sociology (Granovetter and Swedberg, 2001 ) and a handbook (Smelser and Swedberg, 2005 [2nd edn] ) provide ample proof of its fast development in depth and scope. Yet after 20 years of rapid growth, economic sociology finds itself in a phase of reflection and potentially, reconstitution. Increasingly, both the work of the classics and theoretical approaches are critically reconsidered to find new avenues for its future agenda (Aspers, 2001; Granovetter, 2002; Peukert, 2004; Swedberg, 2003) .
In assessing its own identity, shortcomings and potentials, economic sociology is, however, preoccupied with positioning itself in contrast to the economics profession. Its constitutive boundaries are predominantly defined in disciplinary terms where it is common to understand economic sociology as the application of the sociological tradition to economic phenomena (Smelser and Swedberg, 2005: 3) . But this means that for economic sociologists, economics is always the very 'other' whose rejection provides the justification of one's own enquiries. Consequently, its most basic proposition, that economic activity is 'embedded' in broader societal structures and cannot be reduced to either agent's motives or preferences or the imperatives of structures like capitalism, is more than just a simple assertion. It creates a sense of unity for economic sociologists, who would all reject the idea that the economy is detached from society and that consequently the universalistic and under-socialized conception of homo oeconomicus and autistic theorizing of economics have to be rejected. Rather, economic sociologists would all agree that 'truth' values, the meaning of actions and communications depend on the particular context one finds oneself in.
But despite its focus on 'embeddedness' and context, this juxtaposition to the universalism of economics simply reproduced the same universalistic assumptions when it came to its own foundations and its own 'tradition'. The proclaimed 'embeddedness' of economic practices excluded 'economic sociology'. Having drawn the boundary as such, economic sociology had to expend considerable effort to construct its own 'tradition' and thus to again and again open and close discussions over the true meaning of the 'classics'. 1 To consider its own 'contextuality' and its own embeddedness, economic sociology can draw on recent developments in post-linguistic turn social theory. Whereas sociologists are rather reluctant to entertain the thesis that language and communication are constitutive for the 'social' construction of economic institutions, such a reference would mean that only by including considerations of language and the communicative construction of economic practices can economic sociology overcome its own inconsistencies, with important repercussions on the perspective on economics. As soon as we take the linguistic turn in social theory seriously and consider language as constitutive for economic institutions, economics automatically becomes part of economic practices and thus economic sociology. Economic sociologists should be concerned with both how economics shapes economic practices, identities and relations and by which processes the authority and legitimacy to justify claims of 'better knowledge' by economists are reproduced.
To present my argument, this article is structured as follows: the first part proposes the historical analysis of concepts in their interdependence to the evolution of economic institutions as one useful methodology. It therefore engages with the recent discussion on the concept of 'performativity' as one possible avenue for treating language as constitutive for economic institutions. The simple fact that what we cannot describe or explain also means that by introducing a new vocabulary, we see different things. Social change is thus always the result of a clash of several vocabularies and definitions and the task of economic sociologist is to lay bare these clashes.
From this perspective, an economic sociology that takes language and communication into account necessarily pursues two distinct but interrelated investigations simultaneously: first, an enquiry into concepts, semantic distinctions and their change over time. A few key distinctions shape modern understanding of the economy, such as labour and capital, speculation and investment, risk and uncertainty, etc. A deeper analysis of, for example, the emergence of labour and capital as a semantic opposition and how its use shaped practices, identities and relations would help us immensely to understand today's economy. As an explication of this kind of enquiry, the second part of the article focuses on the distinction of risk and uncertainty to provide a semantic field of risk.
The second line of enquiry is an analysis of how these distinctions and their change structure and change economic practices. The third part provides an example by showing how the economic reading of risk in general and models of asymmetric information (AIM) in particular determine contemporary argumentative structures, the resulting policy options and observable dynamics in reforming the global financial architecture. It seeks to show how the 'risk as uncertainty' approach in its latest variant in rational expectations models as dominant paradigm of contemporary economic theorizing shapes recent endeavours to change the global financial architecture. One can often read that 'transparency' and 'good governance' are key for a more stable financial system. These are often presented as technical solutions to sources of financial instability. But economic sociologists should always challenge the view that regulation is a technical matter. For example, contemporary economic theory describes financial instability with models of asymmetric information that are again based on a particular reading of 'risk'. By fostering a particular meaning of risk and uncertainty, In other words, current endeavours to reform the global financial architecture can be understood as the performance of AIM, the imposition of their tacit assumptions onto reality whereby the latter is to adjust to the former.
Performativity
There are several avenues available to analyse the ways in which language shapes the economy, ranging from speech act to discourse analysis. But as it was subject to a heated debate in Economy and Society Vol. 31, No. 2 (2002) and the Economic Sociology Economic Newsletter Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005) , and thus has had already considerable impact in economic sociology, I focus on the concept of performativity. I do not discuss the Miller-Callon exchange in detail, but as processes that we name today 'performativity' can be derived from several social theories, I want to focus on the broader issue of what the concept of performativity in general intends 'to do'.
Generally speaking, the concept of performativity has gained prominence within social theory through the Searle-Derrida debate. Its introduction into analytic philosophy by John Austin (1962) and further development by John Searle (1983) is a direct consequence of the linguistic turn. In particular, Wittgenstein (1953 Wittgenstein ( , 1978 has shown how in the wake of logical paradoxes, logical necessity cannot be assumed a priori but needs to be established discursively. His concept of language game and in particular his town-metaphor for the evolution of language showed that language, the vocabulary and categories we use, necessarily belongs to a particular life-world and changes therewith. Consequently, the self-reference of logic, the condition of its own possibility, does not point to an ahistorically given logic itself, but to the life-world and social conditions of cognition. In this context, categories and concepts are not simply an objective representation of the world, but part of institutional practices (Winch, 1967) .
John Austin coined the term of performatives to convey this idea that there is a link between language and social praxis. As he pointed out, performative predicates do not solely describe facts passively, like constative predicates, but are part of what they describe. For example, to utter 'I do' during a marriage ceremony is not merely a description of getting married, it is part of getting married and thus constitutive for the institution of marriage. Equivalently, to score a goal in soccer or to end a chess game requires a specific utterance by the right people in a particular context. But take away language and you take away the entire institution.
Performativity, language and the social construction thesis are irremediably connected: social institutions are giant performative utterances produced by a social collective (Austin, 1962) .
As performatives have no material counterpart, i.e. inhabit a selfreferential logic, a truth conditional theory of meaning based on a clear separation between objects and 'subjective' language is simply inadequate. To show how performatives create their own reality and how their existence has to be presupposed rather than derived, Austin and Searle located the meaning of performatives in the force of illocutionary acts. This explanation, however, was heavily criticized by Derrida: not intentionality or force, but the iterability of signs (Derrida, 2001) would provide the basis of their meaning. That is, in the ways in which practices were accepted through routinization. After Derrida, performativity changed from being a technical term in analytic philosophy to become a signifier for the embodiment of ideas through iterability (Butler, 1997; Turnbull, 2002) .
In these confines, Michel Callon (1998), Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo (MacKenzie, 2003; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003) have already applied this idea of performativity to economic sociology very successfully. In their investigations, economic models are not passive descriptions of economic phenomena, but play an important part in shaping the economy. But their intuition should not be reduced to the 'effect' of theories. That theories 'shape' the world seems almost trivial: any policy reform (and we have several in Germany) is shot through with insights and causal links established by theories. Where performativity differs is in the acceptance that we create truth values, that what is 'true' is intersubjectively defined; that different ways of knowing, schemes of interpretation and vocabularies are at the very heart of finance and not just derivative to some inner law-like logic.
From this perspective, truth claims, for example made by risk models, cannot be derived from a predetermined world, but are the result of particular socially mediated structures of memories and forgetting that are linked to disciplinary identities and communication patterns. Risk is not a description or a property of an objective reality, or the nature of a decision problem where risk models are just a mirror of this reality. Risk is a particular mode of reasoning that names the boundary between the known and the unknown (Luhmann, 1991) . It allows us to think about a contingent future where it specifies the way in which we know about the unknown. From this perspective, observing performativity of risk is always to engage in second-order observations: we observe how risk shapes the way in which others observe the economy, themselves or other actors. As performativity analyses always require a synchronic enquiry into concepts and economic phenomena, the next section discusses specific ways in which the risk-uncertainty distinction has been used in economics to establish a semantic field where the contingency of defining risk will be highlighted.
Probability, Risk and Uncertainty

Risk as Uncertainty
The evolution of the economic discourse over the past 50 years is marked by the debate on how to treat uncertainty. The currently dominating rational expectations/expected utility approach gained its momentum with the publication of Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neuman's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) where they for the first time proved the rationality of the expected utility hypothesis of Bernoulli axiomatically. In subsequent discussions and refinements provided by Marschak (1950) and Arrow (1953) , a formal apparatus was formed that allowed one to treat uncertainty as risk. This position assumes that an uncertain future can be described in terms of possible states of the world and probability distributions. This is today common standard and a natural assumption in contemporary economics (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992) . Even though expected utility has been criticized vigorously by Machina (1982) , Ellsberg (1961) and Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) among others, it is still the basic element for gameand-contract theory, and thus models of asymmetric information.
This 'uncertainty as risk' position encompasses both the objective and the subjective (behavioural) variations of the expected utility theory.
4 Both take the bet as starting point and thus metaphor for uncertainty. This framework of possible states of the world and probability distributions makes two crucial assumptions: first, it assumes iterability of events by using an aleatoric definition of probability. 5 Only if this condition of infinitely repeatable events and thus the exclusion of any learning from experience holds, are average values and standard deviations calculable. Iteration, on the other hand, is only possible if second, as von Mises nicely argued, decision problems are well defined and neutrally describable, i.e. if ontological questions are determined and epistemological questions of only secondary importance. It comes as no surprise that both Ramsey (1931) and Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( , 1982 , despite their differences, justify important steps by analogy to physics. Taken as such, even critical approaches to expected utility, such as regret or prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Loomes and Sudgen, 1982) and its various applications share a common positivist epistemology and philosophy of science.
to uncertainty. Post-Keynesians stress Keynes's concept of uncertainty to formulate their critique on mainstream economics. To separate himself from the ontological reading of uncertainty, Keynes asserted that:
By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette, is not subject, in this sense to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. . . . The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatsoever. We simply do not know. (Keynes, 1937: 213-14) To see what this passage means, it is necessary to discuss briefly his logical theory of probability, which flourished in turn of the century Cambridge and provides the background of his risk-uncertainty distinction (Lawson, 1988) . According to Keynes, probability names a logical, constant and objective relation between a stock of knowledge entailed in the premises and the conclusion (Keynes, 1921) . In this context, probability is defined in singular terms as being dependent upon a particular stock of knowledge. According to Keynes, probability is not part of the world but part of our engaging with the world where relative frequencies may influence our judgement about probability, but is not probability itself. In other words, Keynes does not start with ontology but with epistemology. Consequently, in stark contrast to expected utility theory, Keynes located first probabilities not in the principle of insufficient reason but in 'intuition', which allowed for 'direct acquaintance' of probability relations. This allowed Keynes to derive conditions under which numerical representation is valid.
6 By readjusting the principle of insufficient reason, Keynes introduced qualitative judgements as an inherent part of probability theory and made, in analogy to quantum physics, thus probabilistic statements part of the most basic laws of the world. The bifurcation of logical space in terms of absence/availability of probability later informed his distinction of risk and uncertainty (Lawson, 1988) . Uncertainty is the realm where probabilities are not available.
This 'we do not know' in his 1937 quote thus represents for Keynes a sphere where normal criteria of rationality do not apply. In uncertain situations, actors could not calculate rational decisions but would fall back on sentiment, confidence, conventions, etc. (Keynes, 1936: 216) . These conventions and norms thus represent a different kind of knowledge and constitute at the same time the limits of a potential applicability of formal reasoning. Current Sociology Vol. 55 No. 1 Uncertainty thus stresses the importance of practical knowledge, the constitutive importance of both the heterogeneity of knowledge and conventions and institutions in economic life.
Austrian economists like Carl Menger or Friedrich von Hayek share this interest in practical knowledge in terms of norms and rules. As Friedrich von Hayek confirms:
Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge. But a little reflection will show that there is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: The knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made. . . . We need only remember how much we have to learn in any occupation after we have completed our theoretical training . . . and how valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions, and special circumstances. (Von Hayek, 1945: 522) Next to the theoretical knowledge about causes and effects, humans possess tacit knowledge that is to be found in norms, cultural traditions and institutions (Ryle, 1949) . This tacit knowledge points at the structuring of social relations. As such, it precedes the formulation of interests and preferences. This implicit 'knowing how' that is constitutive for regulative 'knowing that' questions of cause and effects, expresses itself, like our ability to use language, in rules and practices (Von Hayek, 1945: 528) . Practical knowledge thus does not consist of propositions and theories, but in the ability to follow rules. Von Hayek developed this idea further in his studies on cultural evolution and spontaneous order, where the market is not solely an abstract entity where supply and demand meet, but a discovery process embedded in societal structures. Von Hayek's concept of rule following even encompasses scientific knowledge. The objective of science is not to reveal simple causalities as 'the world in which science is interested is not that of our given concepts or even sensations. Its aim is to produce a new organisation of all our experience of the external world and in doing so it has not only to remodel our concepts but also to get away from the secondary sense of qualities and to replace them by a different class of events' (von Hayek, 1942: 267) .
To conclude this discussion: while both approaches discussed may talk about 'risk' and 'uncertainty', they necessarily talk about different things with important repercussions on their particular understanding of knowledge, rationality and institutions. For example, while the 'risk as uncertainty' position conceptualizes institutions as an allocation mechanism, the 'risk versus uncertainty' approach argues that economic activities and markets are distribution.
institutions and thus cannot be understood without reference to their societal preconditions. What happened in economic theory over the last 50 years, as is widely known, is a transformation of economic thought insofar as the 'victory' of expected utility theory in the 1950s marginalized the vocabulary of genuine uncertainty, rules and norms that were still a common interest of J. M. Keynes and F. A. von Hayek. Today, the identity of economics as a discipline is built on a particular method and mode of reasoning, not on the subject under consideration. This focus on method determines the aesthetic judgements that determine the meaning of its scientific vocabulary and thus the range of possible arguments, i.e. what may count as a good argument or a failure, a mistake or an anomaly. This change in economic thought altered the way in which new information and new research agendas emerge. This sets the stage for analysing how economics as a discipline shapes its world and the economy: these internal boundaries and debates between different approaches structure the way in which economic 'phenomena' are defined. They determine what will be seen and not seen. To apply these considerations empirically, the next section examines how the risk as uncertainty approach conveys the basic definition of financial stability, and how tacit assumptions made by this definition translate now into policy proposals and a reform agenda. Thereby, we witness how the reform of the global financial architecture attempts to make true assumptions made in asymmetric information models.
Performing Risk
There has been much debate over the possibility of reforming the global financial architecture following the period of severe financial turmoil in the late 1990s. In particular, the contagion of financial crises despite the absence of any major economic linkages, like the Russian default to Brazil, led to a significant shift in the rhetoric of financial governance, which increasingly puts emphasis on transparency and good governance as preconditions for financial stability. Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, spoke of transparency as 'the golden rule' (Camdessus, 1999: 16) of the new financial architecture. And indeed, transparency soon became a comprehensive project with over 100 new intended standards and a comprehensive catalogue of new transparency measures (see IMF, 2003) .
Economists are eager to point out that transparency is a technical solution, as the source of recent financial instability has to be sought in the asymmetric dispersion of information between international investors and governments. According to this interpretation of the Asian Crisis, crony capitalism made impossible an efficient working of financial markets. As again Camdessus confirms: 'Markets cannot work efficiently, and they will remain vulnerable to instability in the absence of adequate, reliable, and Current Sociology Vol. 55 No. 1 timely information from all quarters' (Camdessus, 1999: 16) . In this setting instability, or systemic risk, is defined as self-fulfilling prophecy. As Mishkin explains:
Focusing on information problems leads to a definition of financial instability: Financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system can no longer do its job of channelling funds to those with productive investment opportunities. Indeed, if the financial instability is severe enough, it can lead to almost a complete breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, a situation which is then classified as a financial crisis. (Mishkin, 1999: 6 ; emphasis in original) 7 Financial stability or its negative definition of 'systemic risks' so defined is understood in analogy to a bank run (de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Schinasi, 2004) : the relationship between investors themselves and between investors and governments can be considered like the relationship between a bank and its customers: the function of the bank in the economy as intermediary requires the bank to lend money long term and receive deposits short term. Due to this different time structure, a withdrawal of a sufficient amount of deposit in a short period of time might threaten the survival of the bank. Yet as no depositor knows for sure whether other depositors are about to close their accounts, given mutual expectations, it might be individually rational for the depositor to close his or her account first, even if that leads to a collectively irrational result: a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, despite viability, the bank becomes illiquid and goes out of business.
Just like asymmetric information between the bank and depositor gives rise to a specific trust problem among depositors, it also creates a trust problem between institutional investors and governments where sometimes self-fulfilling prophecies, the conflict between individual and collective rationality, prevail. But if asymmetric information is the triggering cause of financial crises, the obvious remedy is informational symmetry among actors secured through transparency. If each actor knows what standardized data mean, like each depositor would know about the financial condition of the 'bank', the trust problem has been overcome. Therefore, as Barry Eichengreen characteristically demands:
. . . the only feasible approach to this problem is for national governments and international financial institutions to encourage the public and private sectors to identify and adopt international standards for minimally acceptable practice. National practices may differ, but all national arrangements must meet minimal standards if greater financial stability is to be achieved. (Eichengreen, 1999: 21) What this quote nicely shows is how systemic risk is reduced to the individual level flanked with the creation of new financial surveillance distribution.
mechanisms, like the creation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the G 20, which were explicitly justified on the basis of their potential to reduce asymmetric information by fostering standardization, spread of best practice and good governance in national governance structures. Now in line with the discussion in the second section of this article, it can be easily shown that transparency is not a 'technical' solution to currency and financial crises. Neither can the lack of transparency explain the European crisis of 1992, nor does transparency explain the phenomenology of currency crises contagion. Almost ironically, empirical analyses have pointed out that 'real' linkages are not significant for contagion patterns (Glick and Rose, 1999) . Instead, credit channels and risk models of big players seem to be more significant (Allen and Gale, 2002; Pritsker, 2001 ). Yet a moment of reflection reveals the revolutionary content of this insight: if risk models are important for explaining contagion, they do not simply mirror economic reality, but shape it, they are a self-referential part of it. Thus risk models create new risks which then give rise to new risk models. A peculiar vicious circle emerges: any attempt to regulate and minimize risks creates new risks and uncertainties, which then generate new regulatory demand and 'better' information and data. In the end, currency crises call into question the traditional, substantially defined concept of financial stability.
Yet by providing the basic definition of financial instability, AIM allows one to reproduce the 'risk as uncertainty' approach, its definition of knowledge, of rationality and thus the criteria for scientific expertise. It seems almost trivial that the legitimacy of AIM as the primary explanation for financial instability results not from the 'world out there' but from internal debates within economics. We can see how this internal debate in economics as discussed in the second section shapes the meaning of financial stability and thereby the entire machinery of standardization, good governance and even recent institutional decisions like the creation of the FSF. These are processes by which AIM create their own reality and implicit assumptions are made true. A static definition of stability is imposed on a dynamic world and now assumptions of AIM are validated by processes of standardization and surveillance. AIM reproduce the image of an economy which obeys some economic laws despite empirical counter-evidence. In other words, AIM help to silence the self-referential questions which financial crises raised thereby reproducing claims of better knowledge by economists.
At the same time, it becomes obvious that this ontological approach misses the central challenges of today's dynamics in global finance, which require a process-oriented concept of stability. First, the picture of the bank run leaves no space for processes of desintermediation, securitization and acceleration of financial innovation that not only mark today's financial markets, but also lead to categorical changes. It is still believed that it makes sense to talk about 'banking' regulation when a company like ENRON can act like a bank without falling into the constituency of banking regulation. Today's endeavours have no solution for the vicious circle, i.e. how new actors and new risk models create new risk structures. From the perspective of a risk versus uncertainty approach, financial instability cannot be defined in terms of asymmetric information, but results from the mutual observation of actors, which creates its own logic and evolutionary drift. A direct intervention in the operational logic in form of intended homogeneity of data dissemination creates new heterogeneities in the form of deviant behaviour.
Conclusion
This article has tried to show two interrelated points: first, one cannot separate language from a deeper understanding of economic institutions. One cannot separate the concepts of risk and uncertainty from the contemporary economy. In this article, economic vocabulary does not just 'explain' an external reality objectively. By analysing the use of economic vocabulary of risk, this article investigates how the use of semantic distinctions results in the construction of specific social structures. Through naturalization and iteration, semantic distinctions inscribe themselves onto reality by structuring practices, memory/forgetting and consequently authoritative and disciplinary knowledge structures (see also, Dannreuther and Kessler, 2004) . Second, economics is, like any other academic discipline, shot through with internal conflicts that have their roots in different social theories. Karin Knorr suggested in a recent interview published in an electronic newsletter that economic sociologists should 'secretly' read economics: No! We should openly engage with it but not to surrender to formalism, but to show how the formal knowledge is not objectively given, but that even mathematics makes epistemological and ontological assumptions that are reproduced in academic discussions and models. And these assumptions have important repercussions and impact on the structuring of today's economy. Rational choice is only one approach in economics, as the discussion of the second secion suggested. Economics is a much more diverse field than commonly perceived from the outside and, like any scientific discipline, it is a social practice with its institutional pathologies and inner conflicts.
Recognizing the various traditions of economic theorizing, different epistemological traditions open up. To realize and embrace the various epistemological traditions, like Austrian and post-Keynesian economics, would allow economic sociologists to step out of the narrow confines of the inner-sociological mantra of the classics. It would allow one to see that, for example Austrian economists struggle with the same problems as many economic sociologists. Indeed, both economic sociologists and heterodox economists discuss the work of Bourdieu and Luhmann intensively. Even Swedberg's attempt to revive Max Weber is a major concern of Austrian economists who work in the line of Ludwig von Mises. On the other hand, having been separated for so long, both traditions show enough diversity to allow for different stimulating discussion. The real conflicts are not found between 'sociology' and 'economics' but between various epistemological traditions. There are as many sociologists working with a rational choice methodology who still believe we could come closer to the truth through a process of conjecture and refutation, as there are post-positivist economists who stress boundaries and processes in their epistemology.
One of these discussions could centre around the concept of performativity, the role of language in constructing economic institutions and their role for understanding their evolution to see how 'newness' is created, how informational content, dangers, threats and, in particular, the unknown are socially constructed. Of course, a fully developed research project would have to focus on the semantic changes at the onset of modernity and maybe today's onset of the postmodern age. It would need to show how assumptions of order, knowledge, science, space and time inform different economic vocabularies. For example, as Koselleck and Luhmann have shown, there has been a fundamental shift from the past to the future, which gave rise to modern concepts of time, probability and risk in the first place. In the age of globalization with its challenge to space, time and knowledge, semantic changes could reveal how economic institutions are subject to permanent change due to changing societal conditions. Notes 1. This does not mean that consulting the old masters is a futile enterprise. Quite the contrary. But a reduction of economic sociology to such a disciplinary enterprise closes more interesting questions than it opens. 2. For a discussion of the linguistic turn and language see Searle (2005) . 3. The exception being the work of Michel Callon and Donald MacKenzie, see later. 4. The latter is associated with Leonard Savage and the entire psychometric, 'behavioural economic' approach to risk. See Savage (1954) . 5. Aleatoric probability theory defines probability by inscribing iterability of events into the definition of probability. Thereby the principle of insufficient principle, cumulative additivity to unity and applicability of Boolean algebra upholds. For classic statements see Kolmogorov (1933) , von Mises (1940) and Ramsey (1931) . Current Sociology Vol. 55 No. 1 6. I maintain, in what follows, that there are some pairs of probabilities between the members of which no comparison of magnitude is possible; that we can say, nevertheless, of some pairs of relations of probability that the one is greater and the other less, although it is not possible to measure the difference between them; and that in a very special type of case, to be dealt with later, a meaning can be given to a numerical comparison of magnitude. (Keynes, 1921: 34) 7. This connection is established through the reference to the basic model of Diamond and Dybvig. See Obstfeld (1996) ; cf. Diamond and Douglas (1983) .
